

Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam

Explaining the "Conservative Turn"

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6

MAPPING RADICAL ISLAM: A STUDY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF RADICAL ISLAM IN SOLO, CENTRAL JAVA

Muhammad Wildan

INTRODUCTION

Solo is a unique city.¹ Previously known as the centre of the great Islamic Mataram Kingdom, Solo is also well known as the heartland of Javanese culture, a culture into which Islam has been mixed. The people of Solo are famous for their distinctive behaviour, graciousness and refined manners, besides their gorgeous *batiks*.² These characteristics also permeate their language, which is the most highly evolved Javanese in Java.³ On the other hand, since the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Solo has become a place where various Islamic radicals have flourished. In the middle of the New Order period, some of the leaders of the Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki opposed the government and openly expressed their desire to establish an Islamic state. Their involvement in the *Usrah* movement in the 1980s forced Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to flee to Malaysia. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's involvement in the establishment of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) in 2000 signified the re-emergence of *Darul Islam's* power in Indonesia in general, and in Yogyakarta and Solo in particular. More recently, the issue of Pondok

Ngruki resurfaced with the school's alleged connections to radical Islamic violence, including the Bali bombings. The International Crisis Group (ICG) first introduced the term the "Ngruki Network" as the "group" most responsible for acts of radical violence since the beginning of the twenty-first century. In its further development, the network has become notorious as Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI), one of the factions of S.M. Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam, which allegedly acts as the link to Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia.⁴

Solo became notorious for the "sweeping" of hotels and bars by vigilante groups targeting Americans and other Western aliens. Although the *Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta* (FPIS) has been at the forefront of such activities, it is not the only vigilante group in Solo. The decline of the Soeharto regime in 1998 was marked by the emergence of vigilante groups who tried to participate in social and political issues, either locally or nationally. All of the above suggests that Solo is rife with radical Islamic groups. Although not all Islamic vigilante groups are "radical", to a certain extent, they are all similarly involved in violent activities.

Despite the proliferation of Islamic radical groups in the city, there have been no significant efforts to adopt *shariah*-based local regulations (*peraturan daerah syariah*). Although some radical groups are concerned with *shariah*, their demand for *shariah*-based regulations has not found widespread support among the Solonese. In other words, only a fraction of society supports the Islamic radical groups in the city. As far as Solo is concerned, the reason for this is simple: Solo and its surrounding regions are overwhelmingly *abangan* in character. *Santri*, or pious Islam, is only an ideal for a minority in the region; radical Islam meets with even less public approval. Thus, minimal support for radical Islam at the grassroots level means that it is impossible for *shariah* legislation to be accepted in the city. The minority position of devout Muslims may explain why this group tends towards radicalism. The fact that they have only recently "converted" to *santri* Islam could be another reason for their radical disposition. To understand the full implications of Islam in the city, we need to start at the beginning.

SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SOLO

Understanding Islam in Solo requires that we start by analysing the origins of the religion's development in the city. The role played by the region's kings was significant for the later development of Islam in Solo. It was

the kings who had, during the colonial period, established the first major educational institutions of Solo, the Pondok Jamsaren and the Madrasah Manba' al-'Ulum. In addition, several villages that played a significant role in the early development of Islam in the city deserve mention, such as Kauman, Pasar Kliwon, and Laweyan. These villages (now wards of the city) have long been strongholds of orthodox Islam, but in order to understand the dynamics of Islamic activism in Solo, it is important to understand that in most other parts of the city and regency, there is a strong *abangan* (nominal Muslim, syncretistic) majority. Finally, I will briefly sketch the role played by the Communist Party in Solo after the coup of 1 October 1965.

Well known today as a major centre of Javanese culture, Solo was founded 265 years ago. The history of the city can be traced back to the history of the Islamic kingdom of Mataram in Kartasura, which was established in 1680 by Susuhunan Amangkurat II (1677–1703). Following a rebellion that destroyed the kingdom, the Mataram Kingdom moved to the eastern region known as Sala (Solo) in 1746. After being divided into two kingdoms under the Treaty of Giyanti (Kasunanan in Surakarta and Kasultanan in Yogyakarta), in 1757, under the Treaty of Salatiga, the Kasunanan kingdom was further divided into two parts: Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. Initially, Solo was just a small village at the edge of the Bengawan Solo River in the Kingdom of Kartasura. Bengawan Solo, the longest river in Java, played a significant role in supporting the life of the Solonese and in connecting Solo with other districts in Central and East Java, as well as to the ocean. The geographical position of Solo in the middle of four other districts — Yogyakarta (West), Semarang (North), Madiun (East) and Wonogiri (South) — gave a significant push to the later socio-economic development of Kasunanan Surakarta. In the 1800s, to control both kingdoms in Surakarta, the Dutch government established an overarching governmental institution, the Residency of Surakarta, which was headed by a European Resident.

Since the mid-eighteenth century, Islam has been a significant phenomenon in the Kingdom of Surakarta. Historical accounts relate that Islam in Solo was well established by the reign of Susuhunan Pakubuwono II (1726–49). Succeeding to the throne at the age of sixteen, under the strong guidance of his grandmother Ratu Pakubuwono, he was deeply concerned about religious issues. For example, Pakubuwono II interacted with Kyai Kasan Besari, the leader of the pesantren Gebangtinatar at Tegalsari Ponorogo in East Java, when he was fleeing the rebellion. Since then, a number of the royal families of Kasunanan Surakarta have sent their sons to pesantren Tegalsari, Ponorogo. Several other royal families

also studied Islam with Kyai Hanggamaya at the pesantren in Kedu Bagelen. As a consequence, a number of prominent Javanese royal poets graduated from these pesantrens: Bagus Banjar (Yasadipura I, 1729–1803), Bagus Wasista (Yasadipura II, 1760–1845), and Bagus Burham (Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita, 1802–73).⁵ Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita, however, is more famous as a visionary than as a royal poet, since his predictions on *Serat Kalatidha* have come to pass in modern times. The Islamic content of some of the above works proves that the development of Islam in Solo in particular cannot be separated from the authority of the Kingdom of Kasunanan; Islam in Solo was mostly developed by the kingdom and tended to be mixed with Javanese values (syncretism). This is one of the reasons why an *abangan* Muslim majority exists in Surakarta in the modern era. However, as the leading historian Ricklefs has observed (1997), the strength of Javanism (*kejawen*) does not prevent the Javanese from being radical or fundamentalist Muslims.

The development of Islam in Solo was encouraged by Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV (1788–1820). Initially, he invited *ulama* from many different places to stay and develop Islam in the city. One of the most famous and prolific of these *ulama* was Kyai Jamsari, from the Banyumas region. He lived and built a mosque and pesantren or pondok (boarding school) on the south-western side of the Kingdom of Surakarta, in what later became known as Jamsaren village (and Pondok Jamsaren). Kyai Jamsari not only taught Islam to the people who lived in the village's surroundings, but also to the kingdom's aristocrats and bureaucrats. The pesantren, however, was destroyed by Dutch colonial troops during the Diponegoro War of 1825–30. In 1878, Kyai Muhammad Idris from Klaten rebuilt and revived the pesantren, which finally reached its peak at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. This development was marked by hundreds of students coming from many parts of Java and its outer islands. Although the pesantren was established by the kingdom, however, it was not fully under the kingdom's control. The involvement of its *santri* during the Diponegoro War reflected the resistance of the pesantren to the kingdom, as well as to the government of the Dutch East Indies.

The success of Pondok Jamsaren inspired the court officials R. Hadipati Sosrodiningrat and Penghulu Tafsir Anom to establish a formal educational institution to encourage more *ulama* to become *penghulu*.⁶ In 1905, with the support of Susuhunan Pakubuwana X, they established a modern Islamic school called Madrasah Mamba' al-'Ulum (the source of knowledge), and appointed Kyai Muhammad Idris as its leader. Unlike other indigenous educational institutions in the form of traditional pesantren, the *madrasah*

was the first indigenous educational institution to establish a modern system of education. At that time, the *madrasah* had 11 levels of classes: 1–4 for elementary education, 4–8 for secondary education, and 9–11 for higher-level education.⁷ The last level to be developed was that of higher education at Mamba' al-Ulum. Although the *madrasah* was initially for royal and aristocratic families, after the demise of the Dutch East Indies government and the consequent decline of the Kasunanan Kingdom, the *madrasah* was opened to the common people (Ardani 1983).

To understand the development of Islam in Solo, we should take account of the role played by a number of pious Muslim majority villages, such as Kauman, Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan. They were deliberately established by the Dutch government and the Kasunanan Kingdom to help them control the various communities. The division of the communities into enclaves was also designed to accommodate the roles they would have to play: Kauman for the religious employees of the kingdom (*priyayi*), Pasar Kliwon for Arabs, Laweyan for Javanese-Muslim businessmen (*santri*), Jebres for Chinese businesspeople, and the other regions for Javanese *abangan*. The enclaves were also arranged to indicate social status; all of the above-mentioned enclaves were high on the social ladder compared to the common people. In the end, given the social and historical factors described above, the *abangan* comprised a majority of the Solonese. Not only were there *abangan* in all suburban areas of Solo, but also in the city's urban areas. Of the existing sub-districts, Pasar Kliwon, Banjarsari, and Jebres have the region's largest *abangan* majorities.

Another key social phenomenon is that of the existence of ethnic Chinese in the city. The presence of Chinese in Indonesia, and in Solo in particular, is not a new phenomenon. According to Cribb, the Chinese only became a “problem” for Indonesians in the nineteenth century, when the Dutch government introduced and maintained a system of racial classification that distinguished between Westerners, other Eastern foreigners, and native people (*inlanders*). Chinese descendants, having initially been classified as *inlanders*, were later separated from the category of “Indonesians” (Cribb 2006). Despite discrimination against this ethnic group, the Dutch government and local kingdoms offered the Chinese privileges during the colonial period, in large part due to their talent in business. To this day, the Chinese are more successful than other ethnic groups in business, not only in Solo, but also in Indonesia as a whole. Although the majority of Arabs in Solo are also traders, even they have not been able to surpass the Chinese in business. Since the early development of the Javanese middle classes, most Javanese traders have benefited from the presence of Chinese or Arab businesses.

From the early period of the Dutch East Indies government onwards, the success of the Chinese in business gave them a higher social status than the Arabs, let alone the Javanese.

The phenomenon of the *abangan* majority in Solo may also explain the mass adherence to Communism during the Old Order. Several months before the Communist Revolt in Madiun in 1948, Solo was one of the power bases of the *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* (FDR), Amir Syarifuddin's Socialist party, which opposed the presidential cabinet of Mohammad Hatta. About 17,000 followers of Syarifuddin went on strike during the Indonesian National Revolution (Onghokham 1978). After the coup d'état of 1 October 1965, unrest spread rapidly to Central Java, where Communists rose in support. On the same day, a *Dewan Revolusi* (Revolutionary Council) was formed in Central Java. A number of government officials in Central Java were involved in Communist Party activities, including the mayor of Surakarta, Utomo Ramelan, and the *bupatis* of Boyolali, Sragen, Wonogiri, and Karanganyar. In fact, the above districts, including Klaten, were the regions that were most heavily influenced by Communism. The special forces of the *Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat* (Army Para-Commando Regiment, or RPKAD), led by Sarwo Edi, that were sent to subdue the Communist uprising, finally seized and secured the city. In November 1965, about 3,000 Communists in Surakarta surrendered, and the Communist Party's secretary general, D.N. Aidit, was reportedly captured and shot dead in the region. Mass killings continued in the countryside, especially in Klaten, where being *abangan* was sufficient reason for being killed.

DAKWAH IN SOLO DURING THE NEW ORDER: PONDOK NGRUKI AND THE USRAH MOVEMENT

The New Order period was highly conducive to the emergence of Islamic radicalism. Government pressure on Muslims during the first phase of this era provoked the rise of Muslim resistance movements. Local conditions in Solo also accelerated the emergence of local Islamic radical groups. Two men in particular, and a pesantren that was founded by them, gained nationwide notoriety as embodying the radical tendencies of Solo. The pesantren Al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki after the village where it is located, was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in order to teach a more rigorous version of Islam than was taught in other schools. Sungkar and Ba'asyir became increasingly disaffected with the New Order regime, and in the course of the 1970s became involved in the underground movement, *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII), which believed

in the armed struggle for an Islamic state. They were arrested and jailed in connection with the *Komando Jihad* affair, a series of terrorist acts carried out by NII activists, and their names surfaced again in a subsequent wave of arrests concerning the *Usrah* affair, a network of clandestine Islamic study groups. In 1985 they fled to Malaysia to escape arrest, thereby losing influence in Pondok Ngruki, but as was reported later, they were the first to send young militants to Pakistan and Afghanistan for *jihad* training.

These two radical preachers were only the most visible Muslim activists in Solo. Their activities were, however, part of a much broader spectrum of *dakwah* activities, in Solo as well as nationwide. The early New Order period saw a shift from Muslim party politics to *dakwah*, at least partly in response to the fact that the main reformist Muslim party Masyumi remained banned. A number of the most prominent ex-Masyumi leaders established an association for *dakwah*, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation, DDII) in 1967. This organization established close connections with the Muslim World League (Rabitah al-'Alam al-Islami) and supported the government's programme to eradicate latent remnants of Communism. Explaining the shift in paradigm of Muslim activism, Mohamad Natsir (1908–93), the founder and leader of the DDII, asserted that “previously we carried out *dakwah* through politics but now we run politics through *dakwah*” (Hakim and Linrung 1997, p. 8). Natsir urged his ex-Masyumi colleagues to establish DDII branches in many parts of Indonesia, including Solo, Central Java. During a speech in Solo in the late 1960s, he asked his ex-Masyumi counterparts to establish more pesantrens and Islamic hospitals to counter attempts to Christianize the local population, which were quite significant in the region at the time. According to Ahmad Chusnan, former leader of the Solo DDII branch, the establishment of Pondok Ngruki, as well as the hospitals Kustati and Yarsi (Yayasan Rumah Sakit Islam) was in direct response to Natsir's suggestion. Along with its general efforts to help Islamic institutions gain access to financial support from Middle Eastern donors, the Solo DDII also helped Pondok Ngruki in various ways. With assistance from the Solo DDII, about ninety new mosques were built across Central Java, including three by Pondok Ngruki. After the death of Natsir in 1993, the Solo DDII declined significantly, and it is no longer an active organization.

Pondok Ngruki was established as an attempt by *ulama* to develop Islam in Solo. Initially, some *ulama* in Solo conducted Islamic teaching (*taklim*) after holding *dhuhr* (the noon prayer) in the Masjid Agung. In 1969, they expanded their activities to include more intensive Islamic teaching, and founded a *madrasah diniyah* (Islamic school), which was

located in the southern part of Kasunanan palace, Gading Kidul. Besides establishing Radio Dakwah Islam Surakarta (RADIS) to extend the scope of their *dakwah*, they also developed the Islamic school into a boarding school in 1972. Several years later, the boarding school moved to the village of Ngruki. Finally, the boarding school joined *Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Al-Mukmin* (the Islamic Education Foundation of Al-Mukmin, or YPIA), which had been established earlier as an umbrella organization.

Although Pondok Ngruki had many founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir became the figureheads of the boarding school. Many teachers from various educational backgrounds assisted with the development of Pondok Ngruki, but Sungkar and Ba'asyir occupied key positions in shaping the boarding school. However, we should not neglect the roles played by graduates from the reformist pesantren of Persis in Bangil, East Java and especially by graduates from the Middle East. Suwardi Effendi, Ahmad Chusnan, Muhammad Ilyas, M. Ya'kub Basya, and Jazri Mu'alim were among the young men who had been chosen by the DDII to pursue Islamic studies in the Middle East, and upon return they not only taught in Ngruki but also helped the school find financial support from Middle Eastern Islamic foundations. In its later development, however, most of the Pondok Ngruki *ustadz* (religious teachers) were recruited from among its own graduates, who held on to the spirit of Sungkar and Ba'asyir. For this reason, it is interesting to examine the backgrounds of these two figures in more detail.

Abdullah (Ahmad) Sungkar was born into a family of Yemeni descent in the Pasar Kliwon sub-district of Solo in 1937. Although his formal education was only up to junior high school level and he never attended a pesantren, he acquired considerable knowledge of Islam through self-study. Having been an active member of Masyumi's youth wing, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement, or GPII), he moved on to the parent organization, the Masyumi, until this was banned in 1960 (Nursalim 2001). His involvement in Masyumi led to his close relationship with M. Natsir, was strengthened further when Natsir established the DDII during the New Order period. Thus the spirit of Masyumi undeniably played an important role in shaping his Islamic thought. His spirit of Islam guided him as a good and tough *da'i* (Islamic preacher) in Solo, and his concern with politics directed his opposition to the government of the New Order era. Sungkar's character became clearer when he co-founded RADIS and Pondok Ngruki.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was also of Yemeni descent, was born in Jombang, East Java, in 1938. He spent his youth in Jombang until the

second grade of senior high school, when he continued his study in the modern pesantren of Gontor. Finishing his study there, he continued at Al-Irsyad University in Solo and the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, in 1964. The political polarization of those years caused Ba'asyir to discontinue his studies and become vigorously involved in the GPII and Al-Irsyad until the late 1960s. As a means of further study, he taught himself by employing the basis of Islamic knowledge that he had already acquired. Being active in the GPII and Al-Irsyad greatly influenced his thought. Through these organizations, he met Abdullah Sungkar, which later shaped his attitude towards politics. Compared to his counterpart Sungkar, Ba'asyir was initially less concerned about politics. However, due to his involvement in Sungkar's activities, he was tried in the courts, detained, and jailed together with his colleague.⁸

After this, both Sungkar and Ba'asyir continuously criticized and opposed the government's regulatory stance towards Muslims. A key focus of their criticism was the imposition of the state ideology of Pancasila (which they perceived as directed against political Islam) and the Pancasila indoctrination course P-4, which was obligatory for all civil servants and students.⁹ They were detained in late 1978 for involvement in the NII, the underground Darul Islam network that H. Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) was trying to resuscitate. Finally, on trial in 1982 after having been held in detention without trial for three years and ten months, they were sentenced to exactly the same amount of time for distributing Abdul Qadir Baraja's book, *Jihad dan Hijrah*, and for refusing to fly the Indonesian flag. Objecting to the light sentence, the prosecutors took the case to the Supreme Court. In 1985, Sungkar and Ba'asyir were summoned by the district court to hear the Supreme Court verdict on their case.¹⁰ To avoid further detention, they fled to Malaysia, and were joined by some of their devout disciples in the following years. In their view, it was not an escape from justice, but a form of *hijrah* (emigration) to escape from the enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet Muhammad's *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina. Although they fled to exile, they left a number of key issues related to the NII behind them: the possible involvement in *Komando Jihad*, the *Usrah* case, and the clandestine Islamic activism within Pondok Ngruki.

Komando Jihad was the name given to the shady network behind a string of violent incidents — armed robberies and bombings of cinemas, night clubs and churches — in various parts of Sumatra and Java in the late 1970s. The perpetrators appeared to belong to the underground NII network that connected remnants of the Darul Islam rebellion and was reviving the

struggle for an Islamic state (and which Sungkar and Ba'asyir had recently joined). Key figures of this network were known to be monitored by the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Badan Koordinasi Inteligen Negara, BAKIN), and the degree of involvement of this agency in the affair never became clear. The authorities referred to some of the actions, raids to collect funds and weapons as the "*Warman terror*", after the suggestive name of the leader of the group, Asep Warman. The first *Komando Jihad* actions in the Solo and Yogyakarta region took place after the arrest of Sungkar and Ba'asyir. The vice rector of the Universitas Negeri Sebelas Maret (UNS), Parmanto, M.A., was assassinated by the Warman group on January 1979, allegedly because he was suspected of informing the police of Sungkar and Ba'asyir's joining NII. In the same month, a student of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta, Hassan Bauw, was murdered by Warman fighters because he was suspected of giving information on Purwanto's escaped assassins to the police. After this, Warman disappeared for a long time and was finally shot dead in Bandung in July 1981.¹¹

Although the *Usrah* affair was not as spectacular as *Komando Jihad*, it played a quite significant role in the regions of Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. Initially, *usrah* was a kind of *tarbiyah* (intensive Islamic education) method used by university students, adopted from the method used by the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslīmīn) in Egypt to educate its members. Developed extensively at the Salman mosque of the Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) by Imaduddin Abdurahim, *usrah* later became widespread in a number of big universities in Java, such as at the Universitas Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta and the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in Yogyakarta.¹² Almost at the same time, Sungkar adopted this cell system to broaden his networks. To support the new *tarbiyah* method, Ba'asyir composed an *usrah* manual (Santosa 1996). Sungkar's *usrah* system developed rapidly in Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta, largely due to the networks of the NII branch he came to lead. This mechanism was very effective in attracting new members, especially youths. Among the networks of the *usrah* were the activists of the Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta, which published the tabloid *al-Risalah*.¹³ This tabloid was circulated in many regions using the *usrah* networks. Nevertheless, only two years after its establishment, in 1985, the government cracked down on the *usrah* activities, arresting and imprisoning of about twenty-nine of the activists, including Irfan Suryahardi (currently better known as Irfan S. Awwas) and Shobarin Syakur. Irfan, the editor of *al-Risalah*, was sentenced to thirteen years in jail, a very heavy sentence even during the Soeharto regime.

In the wake of Sungkar and Ba'asyir's departure for Malaysia, the NII network within Pondok Ngruki continued to function well. Although some of their devout disciples had joined them in Malaysia, other top leaders were still at Pondok Ngruki. The changing political attitude under the New Order in the late 1980s encouraged underground Islamic activists at Pondok Ngruki to expand their networks. Unlike before, during this period, they tried to acquire more followers by establishing further closed Islamic study circles in the *pesantren*. The numbers of Ngruki students eager to join these closed study circles kept increasing, especially from the Kulliyah al-Mu'allimin (KMI) and Kulliyah al-Mu'allimat (KMA), the schools with an exclusively religious curriculum for male and female students, respectively.¹⁴ However, the "virus" of *harakah* (the clandestine Islamic movement) also reached the other schools in Ngruki, such as the Madrasah Aliyah of Al-Mukmin (MAAM). Whereas in the early 1980s it had been only a few students, who appeared to be exceptionally pious and dedicated, who would be regularly taken aside for special instruction by some of the militant *ustadz*, by the end of the decade, almost all of its pre-graduates swore an oath of loyalty to the leaders of the clandestine Islamic movement, although most of them did not really understand what this entailed, nor did they care about it. The underground network within Pondok Ngruki grew rapidly in the early 1990s. It was clear, therefore, that although Sungkar and Ba'asyir were not physically present, they still controlled the underground elements of the *pesantren*.

The progress of Islamic activism within Pondok Ngruki was halted by an incident known as the "case of 1995". For a long time, Pondok Ngruki, especially at the schools of the KMI and KMA, had been a breeding ground for Islamic activists. The YPIA foundation that managed the school (and that cared more about good relations with the authorities) thought that this contradicted the guidelines of the foundation. The foundation then issued a regulation to limit *harakah* activity within the *pesantren*, which eventually brought about a dispute between the foundation and a number of senior *ustadz*. The fierce dispute finally led to the dismissal of three senior *ustadz* — Abdul Manaf, Abdurrahim, and Djamaluddin — from the *pesantren*, later followed by the resignation of about 50 junior *ustadz* and 400 *santri*, who believed that Pondok Ngruki had lost its Islamic spirit. This enormous loss of staff and students was a great shock for the foundation and the *pesantren*. The three fired *ustadz*, followed by their devout followers, eventually established a new higher educational level boarding school at

Gading, Ma'had 'Ali An-Nur. A number of other junior *ustadz* and *santri* joined another pesantren in outer Surakarta, Boyolali, the pesantren of Dar al-Syahadah. The new boarding schools proved to be quite similar to Pondok Ngruki in many respects, particularly ideologically.

The "case of 1995" in Pondok Ngruki was also the result of a number of other problems facing the Islamic clandestine organization. Around 1993, Abdullah Sungkar, the leader of the NII in the Central Java and Yogyakarta region, ran into difficulties with the top leader of the NII, Ajengan Masduki, concerning his request to establish an autonomous branch of the NII in Malaysia. Ajengan Masduki rejected the request and Sungkar was dismissed from the NII, leading Sungkar to establish a new faction of the NII, which later became known as Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI). The establishment of the new faction brought about enormous changes within the NII, especially in its membership. Another explanation for the founding of this faction is that Sungkar was gradually shifting towards a more Salafi position. Since Sungkar and Ba'asyir had been in touch with radical Arab ulama in Afghanistan, they had been strongly influenced by Middle Eastern thought, especially Salafism. Eventually, many members of the clandestine organization had to choose between the leadership of Sungkar or Masduki.

Meanwhile, Sungkar and Ba'asyir used their presence in Malaysia to broaden their network. During their fourteen years in Malaysia, besides being involved in many religious activities, they had the good fortune to build an international network. Although they were in exile, their network in Indonesia functioned well, including their spiritual roles in Pondok Ngruki. In Malaysia, besides preaching in some districts, they also co-founded an Islamic school called Madrasah Luqman al-Hakim in the sub-district of Kuala Pilah, Johor Malaysia. Through the Luqman al-Hakim, Sungkar and his disciples taught Islam as they had done in Pondok Ngruki. Therefore, Luqman al-Hakim graduates were very similar to the graduates of Pondok Ngruki in terms of their militancy and opposition to the government. Noordin M. Top and Azahari Husin, the key figures in the JI, who were to become notorious in Indonesia as the masterminds behind numerous bombings, were among the activists of this madrasah. In late 1999, when the political situation in Indonesia changed dramatically, Sungkar and Ba'asyir went home. Sungkar suffered a heart attack and died in Bogor in November 1999, before he had had a chance to reorganize Pondok Ngruki. His death left many questions concerning the existence of JI, the organization that would be suspected of organizing a series of violent and devastating bombings in Indonesia in 2000 and later.

OTHER DAKWAH ACTIVITIES IN SOLO: MAJELIS TAFSIR ALQUR'AN AND JAMA'AH GUMUK

As *abangan* are still the majority in Solo, Islamic organizations conduct many *dakwah* efforts in the region. Although one could not claim that Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) have failed altogether to conduct *dakwah* in Solo, they are less prominent in Solo than some other organizations. A number of “home-grown” Islamic organizations, such as Majelis Tafsir al-Qur'an (MTA) and the Jama'ah Gumuk, appear to be widely accepted by the Solonese. But in the end, not one of the above Islamic organizations could be considered as the mainstream in this *abangan* majority region.

Although Muhammadiyah and the NU have exceeded other moderate Muslim organizations in terms of establishing educational institutions, they have failed to re-Islamize and modernize the Solonese. The *abangan* are still in the majority and there are some radical groups in the city. Therefore, it is difficult for board members of Muhammadiyah and the NU in the region to give a clear answer when asked where the main base of each of organization is. Even among the people of Solo's Kauman district, who tend to be the most “modernist” Muslims, Muhammadiyah has no strong presence, unlike the Kauman of Yogyakarta.¹⁵ As far as Muhammadiyah in Solo is concerned, only a small number of the organization's Muslim figures are from the Kauman. The success of Sarekat Islam in Solo in the early twentieth century may be the reason why the NU and Muhammadiyah never became very influential there.

The district of Kauman has lost its position as the centre of Islamic life in Solo; at present, Laweyan, with its industrious Muslim middle class, is seen as the heart of the Muslim community. Amien Rais, the former leader of Muhammadiyah and the chairman of the People's Consultative Council, the MPR, is from Laweyan. Even so, one could hardly call Laweyan a major base for Muhammadiyah. No organization from outside ever became very influential there, perhaps because the peculiarities of the Solonese are not fully understood by “alien” Islamic organizations. The successful organizations are all local ones.

Majelis Tafsir Alqur'an

The Majelis Tafsir Alqur'an (the Council of Qur'anic Exegesis, or MTA) is the most successful Islamic organization in Solo in terms of its membership. Abdullah Thufail Saputra's (d. 1992) desire to purify Muslims' Islamic beliefs

in Surakarta drove him to become involved in Islamic activities. Initially, together with other ulama in Solo, he was involved in the radio station for Islamic *dakwah*, RADIS, in the late 1960s. Several years later, in 1972, by which time Sungkar and Ba'asyir had established a boarding school in Ngruki, Thufail established a forum for Islamic teaching, which later became the MTA, in Pasar Kliwon sub-district. At the same time he worked with Abdullah Marzuki to develop a boarding school: Pondok Pesantren Modern Islam (PPMI) Assalaam, the most modern Islamic boarding school in the region. Thufail was eventually inspired to develop his own activities.

There are no significant doctrinal differences between the MTA and Muhammadiyah; indeed, Thufail initially also participated actively in Muhammadiyah. Thufail is said to have established a separate organization, MTA, because he was disappointed with Muhammadiyah's less rigorous attitude towards dubious local beliefs and practices. Like Muhammadiyah, MTA's stated purpose is to purify Muslims' Islamic beliefs. Therefore, Thufail invited Muslims to study, comprehend, and apply the Qur'an purely and consistently, in the way that the first generation of Muslims or companions had done. This implied dissuading Muslims from any *bid'ah*, *khurafat* or *takhayyul*, the practices reformists condemn as deviating from the genuine Shariah.¹⁶ In this respect, the MTA and Muhammadiyah shared the same purpose. However, as Abdullah Thufail's successor Ahmad Sukino asserts, Muhammadiyah did not exert sufficient effort to ensure that its members follow proper Islamic teachings, and especially to avoid *takhayyul*, *bid'ah* and *khurafat*. He claims that there is no significant difference between the MTA and Muhammadiyah, except that the MTA compels its members to actually stick to the pure teachings of Islam. Another significant difference is that the MTA does not have periodical congresses at which a new leadership is elected, as Muhammadiyah does. It is clear that Ahmad Sukino will run the organization as long as he remains alive, as did Abdullah Thufail before him.

Currently, the MTA is a large Islamic organization, no longer only locally in Surakarta, but also nationally. In 2007 the MTA claimed to have about 25 provincial branches (*perwakilan*), more than 128 district branches (*cabang*), and no fewer than 100,000 members all over Indonesia.¹⁷ By 2011, the MTA had spread to almost all provinces of Indonesia, and is now present in almost all districts in Java, with the exception of the West Java and Banten provinces. In the city of Solo itself, the MTA has a large following, especially in sub-districts with *abangan* majorities, such as Pasar Kliwon and Banjarsari. However, in other regions of the former Surakarta residency, the MTA has more than 50 sub-district branches. One interesting aspect of this organization is that most of its members are

lower-level *abangan* people on the periphery and in rural areas. Clearly, the MTA's simple approach to Islam does not attract much attention among educated people, let alone university students. Currently, to support its *dakwah* activities, the MTA runs several junior and senior high schools and broadcasts a radio station from its headquarters, and also broadcasts live on the Internet.¹⁸

The high level of social solidarity among members of the MTA is one of the most interesting aspects of the organization. The organization collects money in the form of *infaq*, *zakat*, *sadaqah*, and other charity funds, so as to finance the organization and help its members. This commitment to social solidarity led the organization's leader to stipulate that all animals offered at rites celebrating 'Id al-Adha (the Feast of Sacrifice) should be collected and distributed equally among the members. On the occasion of the 2006 'Id al-Adha celebration for instance, the MTA collected around 110 cows and 300 goats. In the same way, the MTA collected charity funds to help its members during the earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java in 2006, and also the Merapi eruption in 2010. This attitude has attracted many people from low-level social groups to the organization; religious issues, initially, are not the main reason for *abangan* to become involved in the community.

Like other Islamic organizations, the MTA does not actively campaign for the adoption of Shariah-based local regulations. Although the organization holds that ultimately all legislation should be based on the *Shariah*, it has not put the issue on its main agenda. For the MTA, according to Sukino, the demand for Shariah implementation will emerge automatically from society when people know more about Islam. Therefore, the MTA's main task is to educate Muslims about their religion. Furthermore, the organization does not hold that the state should necessarily be an Islamic state. For the MTA, in its current form as Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, NKRI), Indonesia makes it possible for Muslims to live in accordance with the Shariah. Hence, the notion of *jihad* is not a concern of this organization, except in the general sense of making an effort for improvement. The enormous MTA membership and network has led many politicians to attempt to recruit the MTA as a mass constituent. Sukino turned down invitations by some politicians to join their parties. The MTA tells its followers that any Muslim political party is acceptable as long as it strives to promote Islam. So far, therefore, the MTA has not become attached to any particular Islamic political parties.

From the above we can clearly conclude that the MTA is not a radical movement. Although the MTA does have about 4,000 uniformed and trained

vigilantes, this force is deployed for general purposes and not for any violent activities. Sukino maintains that radical activities, such as the “sweepings” (i.e. raids on night clubs and hotels) conducted by vigilante forces in Solo, are unnecessary. Such radicalism, he adds, could even damage the image of Islam. Indeed, the MTA’s vigilante force has joined demonstrations in Solo, but only in support of certain issues that were debated in the national parliament, such as the draft law on national education (*Sistem Pendidikan Nasional* or *Sisdiknas*),¹⁹ the draft law on pornography,²⁰ and the demand to ban the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Moderate and non-violent, MTA’s ability to mobilize large numbers suggests that it will remain a significant Islamic social movement in the near future.

Jama’ah Gumuk

Another influential Islamic organization in Solo is the Muslim community known as Jama’ah Gumuk. Founded by H. Mudzakir in 1976, this community is located at a mosque in the ward of Gumuk, Mangkubumen, in the city of Solo. Initially, it only offered informal religious teaching for local residents. But over time, Mudzakir’s activities attracted increasing numbers of people to study Islam with him. Although the Islamic teaching of this group differs little from that of other modern Islamic organizations, it tends to be quite an exclusive organization. However, Chalid Hasan, one of the leaders of the community, asserts that his solid community has a broad network covering the Surakarta region. The community’s cell system has enabled it to become widespread, not only in Solo but also in some other regions in the ex-residency of Surakarta.

Many people consider the Gumuk mosque community to be fairly exclusive, since the organization and its activities are closed to the surrounding society. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the 1980s, other groups suspected the Gumuk mosque community of being Shi’ites. In fact, there are many reasons why other groups made this assumption. The leader of the community, Mudzakir, once studied Islam at Yayasan Pendidikan Islam (YAPI) in Bangil, which is one of the major centres of Shi’ite learning in Indonesia. Moreover, Mudzakir also spent some time in Iran studying Islam. However, judged by their actual teachings and their daily activities, the Jama’ah Gumuk cannot be considered Shi’ite. In my observations, the way in which this community prays is like that of other Muslim groups, though they are clearly not mainstream. They also distinguish themselves from the politically radical Islamist groups in rejecting the Qur’anic exegesis by Sayyid Qutb, the chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, which

provides a revolutionary, political reading of the holy text. Instead, this community uses the modern Qur'anic exegesis by Ahmad Mustafa al-Maraghi, popular among reformists, and the classical one by Imam Ibn Katsir. The way they dress is reminiscent of Salafis: the men grow beards and wear trousers that do not cover the ankles;²¹ the women of this group, however, do not wear head-to-toe coverage as Salafis do, but only regular *hijab*. Unlike other Salafis, however, who do not usually question the legitimacy of existing governments as long as the head of state is a Muslim, the Jama'ah Gumuk regards the Indonesian government as well as the Indonesian state as basically illegitimate. Even to merely acknowledge the legitimacy of the Indonesian government is *haram* for followers of the movement, and so is participation in any project or organ of the state. There is no explicit instruction to members not to join any political party, but most members make it quite clear that they consider Islamic political parties as useless. In the vocabulary of other Salafis, the Gumuk congregation is Salafi in terms of its ideology (*'aqidatan*) but not in its overall approach (*manhaj*).

Like the MTA, the Jama'ah Gumuk was originally a local (Solo-based) Islamic organization. This may have made it easier for the Solonese to accept it. In terms of its followers, most of the members of the community are lower-class Javanese from the periphery or suburbs of Solo; that is, people of *abangan* background. It is probably true that this conservative group, like the MTA, exerted a strong attraction precisely to *abangan* who were turning to a more explicitly Islamic identity. Another interesting aspect of the *Jama'ah Gumuk* is that during the New Order era, the community tended to concentrate on basic Islamic teaching (*taklim*), and was not interested in social and political issues. However, in the Reformation era, the community began to engage in social and political issues, and it even developed vigilante forces known as the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta, FPIS) and the Hawariyyun (Disciples). We will discuss the FPIS in more detail in the next section.

Oppositional mobilization in the late New Order period

A further interesting aspect of Islam in Solo during the New Order era was the phenomenon of *Mega-Bintang*. Prior to the general election in 1997, many people demanded that Soeharto resign from the presidency, even before the monetary crisis at the end of 1997. As was common during New Order elections, the government party of Golongan Karya (Functional Groups, Golkar) was set to win a vast majority. Solo had, however, long been a mass base for the oppositional Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) and,

after a government-engineered conflict in this party, of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P), led by Sukarno's daughter Megawati. Dissatisfaction with the regime was widespread in Solo, especially among the poorer segments of the population, mostly *abangan*, and the demand for Soeharto's resignation galvanized them. In this situation a unique coalition of forces emerged. Mudrick M. Sangidoe, a popular leader of the Solo branch of the Muslim Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), saw an opportunity to defeat the "unbeatable" party, Golkar, and concluded an alliance between the two opposition parties. This unlikely coalition, which soon became known by the name of Mega-Bintang,²² aroused much enthusiasm locally and mobilized much support. The alliance between an Islamic party and a secular nationalist party against the domination of Soeharto and Golkar had not earlier happened during the New Order, and it was popular in both parties at the grassroots level, not only in Solo but also in other major Indonesian cities. The national leaders of both parties, however, did not see this as their chance to defeat Golkar, and therefore refused to conclude a formal coalition. Although both parties were defeated in the 1997 election, Mega-Bintang can be regarded as a genuine grassroots phenomenon.

The Mega-Bintang movement reflected the general social situation in Solo. That is to say, Mega-Bintang was not a balanced coalition between the followers of the PPP and the PDI-P, since the PPP could draw on significantly less support in Solo. The lower-class *abangan* people are a politically volatile group that can be swayed by other groups. In the early twentieth century, when the first political movements emerged, lower-class *abangan* people had been attracted to *Sarekat Islam* and the fascinating mix of Islamic and Communist ideas of local *Sarekat Islam* leader, Haji Misbach. In general, I would say that what attracted people to *Sarekat Islam* then and to Mega-Bintang more recently was not any specific Islamic teaching but the prospect of overcoming their powerlessness, or at least showing defiance of hegemonic powers. In the future, these lower-class people may be drawn in other directions that promise an improvement in their current social status.

Although organizations such as the MTA, Jama'ah Gumuk and Muhammadiyah have been successfully conducting campaigns of Islamization (sometimes called *santrinisasi*, i.e. turning *abangan* into *santri*), the vast majority in Solo continue to be *abangan*. On the other hand, the Islamization process will not automatically make people moderate Muslims. In fact, most radical movements draw a large part of the following from former *abangan*. In the end, it will depend on which organization can successfully attract and lead them in a particular direction.

RADICAL ISLAM IN SOLO IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA

The dramatic political changes in Indonesia were signalled in part by the emergence and re-emergence of radical Islamic groups. These groups emerged in various forms, either formally as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Islamic Warriors, MMI), clandestinely as the *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI), or in the form of vigilante forces (*laskar*) such as the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, or FPI). The new era has also been marked by the increasing demand for Shariah implementation in many parts of Indonesia. Along with the demand for Shariah, vigilante forces have emerged throughout the country that took control of the streets and attempted to impose public morality (i.e., ban alcohol, gambling and prostitution). In the context of Solo, there has not been a significant demand for Shariah, but vigilante forces emerged during the early years of the post-Soeharto era. The Pondok Ngruki phenomenon re-emerged after it was revealed that some of the bombers behind the Bali blast in 2002 were from Ngruki networks. This section will explore several vigilante forces in Solo; Pondok Ngruki networks will be addressed in a separate section.

Unlike other cities in Indonesia, vigilante forces in Solo are significant in terms of their numbers and activities. Over time, there have been at least nine vigilante forces of local (Solonese) origin, as well as a few local chapters of national level paramilitary movements. These forces are the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta, FPIS), Laskar Jundullah (Soldiers of God Militia), Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (Militia of Surakarta Muslims), Tim Hisbah (Team for Upholding God's Law),²³ Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang (Sunan Bonang's Party of God militia),²⁴ Hawariyyun (the Disciples), Brigade Hizbullah (the Party of God Brigade), Barisan Bismillah (Bismillah Forces), and Al-Ishlah (Reform). Local branches of Jakarta-based movements include the Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah (the Ka'bah Youth Movement, or GPK), which is affiliated with the PPP, and the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI). Each of these forces reflects the diversity of the Muslim community in Solo. In many cases, the organizations act together to respond to issues they are concerned about. However, since most of them emerged in political circumstances, only a few are still active as vigilante forces. For this reason, I will only explore the FPIS as representative of the other vigilante forces in Solo.²⁵

Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta

The FPIS emerged in response to the inter-religious conflict in Ambon in the early 1999, as did some other paramilitary groups in Indonesia, such as Laskar Jihad. Although the organization was not as involved in the Ambon battlefield as Laskar Jihad, it has a significant presence in Solo and in Indonesia in general. As a local Islamic group, however, the FPIS is not only concerned with local issues in Solo, but also national and even international issues affecting Muslims. The organization's activities have included flocks of people taking to the streets to protest against government policies or U.S. policies in the Muslim world. Warsito Adnan, the most prominent leader of the FPIS, acknowledges that the emergence of a number of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, including Solo, has mostly been in response to U.S. hegemony and the perceived war on Islam, notably the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and U.S. support for Israeli policies in Palestine. Although the FPIS was initially an inclusive organization that was intended as an umbrella organization for all Islamic groups, in its later development it became exclusively affiliated with the Jama'ah Gumuk. The "acquisition" of the FPIS by the Jama'ah Gumuk is among the more interesting aspects of the FPIS.

Similar to other vigilante forces in Indonesia, most of the actions carried out by the FPIS are what are called anti-*maksiat* (anti-immorality) actions: heavy-handed operations against gambling, alcohol consumption and illicit sex. Although the FPIS recognizes that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, it nevertheless demands that the existing regulations concerning moral issues should be reinforced. Therefore, the FPIS periodically sweeps such places as brothels, gambling centres, cafes, and hotels, which it regards as immoral and in violation of God's law. During the fasting month of Ramadan, the FPIS usually intensifies its activities, not only with regard to the above places, but also *vis-à-vis* regular restaurants. The FPIS demands that restaurants be closed during daytime, out of respect for Muslims who are fasting, or at least that there should be no visible eating. The group's most controversial action has been the "sweeping" of international hotels in Solo and the expulsion of foreigners, especially American nationals, in response to the U.S. policies such as the invasion of Iraq.

The religious ideology of FPIS and the Jama'ah Gumuk remains elusive. Unlike some other vigilante groups, the FPIS has not shown much interest in demanding local Shariah regulations. On this issue, one of the leaders of the Jama'ah Gumuk, Chalid Hasan, asserts that it only makes sense to adopt such regulations when society is ready to accept the *Shariah*. He

holds up the experience of Aceh as an example from which Muslims should learn: Aceh was given Shariah legislation from above, well before society was ready for it, and that caused a backlash. In his view, therefore, it is the task of Islamic organizations to strengthen Islamic awareness at the grassroots so that the entire Shariah will be accepted as part of the body of Islam. Once society is ready for it, it will be possible for Muslims to not only propose regional Shariah regulations, but also to coerce observance by society.²⁶ Therefore, the Gumuk people have not responded positively to the escalating demands by Muslims in many parts of Indonesia for the regional regulation of Shariah. Mudzakir asserts that regional Shariah regulations are good politically, but not ideologically, since they do not change the non-Islamic character of the state. Rather, Mudzakir asserts that Shariah should be implemented from the smallest systems of society upwards: the family or the school.²⁷

Unlike in Pondok Ngruki, *jihad* is not widely discussed in the Gumuk community. While the Ngruki people tend to say that *jihad* should be interpreted more in terms of actual physical struggle, the Gumuk community, as asserted by Chalid, believe that this term has much a broader interpretation than just fighting and wars, although these latter activities should not be neglected. In the same way, some radical Islamists' interpretations of *jihad* in terms of violence are not readily accepted by this community. Chalid believes that the Prophet Muhammad himself did not require the existence of an Islamic state for the implementation of *Shariah*. For him, therefore, *jihad* in terms of violent actions should be the last resort for the implementation of the Shariah. Nor is a coup d'état the best road towards the implementation of the Shariah.²⁸

Chalid resolutely rejects such actions as the Bali bombings, although he can understand why some people become involved in such violent activism. He recognizes that there may be situations in which violence might be necessary to protect Muslim interests. On the other hand, the Gumuk group believes that regional violent conflicts such as those in Ambon and Poso are completely different from the Bali bombings, and cannot be seen as terrorism. On one occasion, Mudzakir asserted that the Ambon and Poso wars had happened primarily as a result of the government's inability to deal with the social problems in those regions. Similarly, the Gumuk group believes that the economic problems faced by Indonesians since the downfall of the Soeharto regime have been due to the government's ignorance of Islamic social and political teachings, as well as simple incompetence. The Gumuk community rejects the labelling of some radical Islamists in Indonesia as terrorists.

Much like many other radical Islamists, the Gumuk group considers the West to be part of the current problems faced by Muslims. The hegemony of the West, as represented by the globalization and modernization of many aspects of life, is regarded as a threat. The West, especially the U.S., is considered to be hostile to Islam, on the grounds that U.S. actions are seen as being driven by Jewish interests (the Jews being the arch-enemies of Islam). Democracy and pluralism, as part of Western culture and civilization, are considered by the community to be *haram*, since they violate God's law. In their view, democracy as a state system mixes truth (Islam) with falsehood (democracy).²⁹ The Gumuk group argues that introducing democracy will not lead to a reduction in any immoral practices (*maksiat*) in society, as these are widespread in Western countries.³⁰ Rather than democracy, Islam has a much more perfect political system, namely *shura*, consultation.³¹ For them, Islam is more than just a religion; it is a way of life, which organizes the relationship not only between human beings and God, but also between human beings.

As a result, the unity of the *ummah* is the main and ultimate agenda of the Gumuk group. The group's discourse, as outlined above, is constructed to draw support from society in such a way as to unite all Muslims. Mudzakir also asserts that one of the weaknesses of Muslims is that they are split into many different Islamic organizations, each of which has its own individual purposes. To achieve unity among Muslims, therefore, he argues that the Gumuk community should not consider itself an Islamic organization. He believes that Islamic organizations and parties do not unite Muslims, but divide them.³² Based on the same reasoning, the Gumuk group believes that Islam does not recognize the existence of *madzhabs* (schools of Islamic jurisprudence). Mudzakir argues that the existence of *madzhabs* such as the Shafi'i or Hanafi schools only divides Muslims. He believes that the only proper *madzhab* in Islam is that of the *salaf*, that is, the generation of the Prophet, his companions, and the two generations after them. Other Islamic schools of thought, such as the Hanbali *madzhab*, do not represent an authentic interpretation of Islam. Therefore, Muslims should not only study Islam as practised by the first generations of Muslims, but they also should imitate their outlook and behaviour.

Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Kompak)

Another significant radical organization in Solo is Kompak (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, the Action Committee for Crisis Response). Although it remains unclear where and when the first *Kompak*

was established, the *Kompak* branch in Solo was established in August 1998 by members of the Solo branch of DDII. Since historically, the Solo branch of DDII has had a relationship with the former leader of Pondok Ngruki, Abdullah Sungkar, the *Kompak* was supported by a number of Pondok Ngruki associates, especially Aris Munandar, a Ngruki graduate. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir reportedly served as advisor to the DDII's *Kompak*, besides a number of other prominent figures in Solo. The outbreak of religious conflict in Ambon inspired some JI members to use the *Kompak* as a means to act in Ambon and Poso. In addition, the *Kompak* also has branches in Ambon and Makassar. In many ways, then, the *Kompak* and JI have become intertwined, making it difficult to distinguish between the two. The *Kompak*, however, has also been involved in many social causes, such as helping Muslim victims of floods or earthquakes. For this reason, *Kompak* is now widely known as a prominent agent in the provision of emergency aid to victims. The cooperation between *Kompak* and the MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue-Centre), an Indonesian Muslim humanitarian organization, in helping Muslims in Afghanistan after the U.S. bombing campaign in late 2001, was one of the reasons why some international Muslim organizations sent financial aid to *Kompak*.

THE NGRUKI NETWORK IN THE POST-SOEHARTO PERIOD

After having been mostly involved with mainstream educational issues since the mid-1980s, Pondok Ngruki resurfaced at both the national and international levels in the post-Soeharto era. During the fourteen-year period of absence of Sungkar and Ba'asyir, Ngruki had developed into the centre of close-knit network of like-minded people, as graduates settled all over the country, and several of them established similar boarding schools elsewhere. Some of these schools — Al-Islam in Lamongan, Ma'had 'Ali Al-Nur in Sukoharjo, Muttaqien in Rembang, and Dar al-Syadahad in Boyolali — were to draw attention because former students were involved in terrorist actions, but most of the schools stayed aloof from radical activism.³³ Tensions between radicals and more moderate elements in this network were inevitable, as Ba'asyir's return to Ngruki appeared to strengthen the hand of the radicals.

After his return from Malaysia in 1999, Ba'asyir took up his previous activities as a teacher at Pondok Ngruki. The foundation could not forbid him doing so because he is one of the founders of the pesantren. To limit Ba'asyir's influence, the foundation did not give him a strategic position

in the boarding school. Rather, it gave him a non-structural position as a spiritual leader (*sesepuh*), which lacked any real power within the pesantren. In Ngruki, besides Ba'asyir, there is yet another successor to Sungkar: Ustadz Wahyuddin, the son-in-law of Sungkar, who now acts as the director of the pesantren. However, since it is clear that Wahyuddin has a tendency to see Ba'asyir as his mentor, there appears to be no possibility of disagreement between the two as to who should be heir to the Sungkar legacy.³⁴ Wahyuddin apparently defers to Ba'asyir but he tends to have more moderate views than him. According to one of my respondents in Ngruki, Wahyuddin sees the pesantren as an educational institution only and not as the base for any Islamic movement (*harakah*).

Ba'asyir's presence in Indonesia brought new life to his old networks of Islamic radicals, notably the *Usrah* network. He allowed or instructed two of his previous disciples in the *Usrah*, Irfan S. Awwas and Sobarin Syakur, to establish a formal, legal association that would bring together various groups and individuals who shared the ideal of an Islamic state, the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). At the founding congress in Yogyakarta in August 2000, Ba'asyir himself was chosen as the *amir* (top leader) of the decision-making body, *ahl al-halli wa al-'aqdi*. Several well-known activists of the former *Komando Jihad*, such as Abdul Qadir Baraja and Timsar Zubil, also attended this congress. The MMI operates within the frame of Indonesian law, although it makes no secret of its desire to change the legal system and replace it by the systematic application of the Shariah. It rejects the parliamentary system and boycotts the general elections.

Ba'asyir is also accused of leading the underground Jama'ah Islamiyah, which he had founded with Sungkar during their Malaysian exile. Much of the violent radicalism during the post-Soeharto era has been attributed directly or indirectly to Ba'asyir. The detention of some members of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia in Singapore, the ICG publication on the Ngruki networks, the involvement of some Ngruki graduates in the Bali bombings, and the revelation that the JI had been responsible for devastating bombings convinced the authorities that Ba'asyir was the spiritual leader of the JI, and that this was the branch of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. After an exhaustive search, the authorities arrested him in October 2002 and brought him to trial. The case against him was strengthened when it was found that two Ngruki graduates were involved in the Bali bombing in 2002, six in the J.W. Marriot bombing in 2003, five in the Kuningan bombing in 2004, and finally, two Ngruki graduates were involved in the second Bali bombing in 2005. Based on all of the above evidence, it was widely taken for granted that Pondok Ngruki

was a major centre for violent Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. However, the above facts were insufficient to prove that Ba'asyir was the spiritual leader of the JI and directly involved in any of the said violent incidents. After having been incarcerated for about four years, Ba'asyir was released in June 2006.

A few years later, Ba'asyir resigned from the MMI over a conflict concerning the organization's internal democratic procedures (more precisely, on the rule that the periodical congress elects the *amir* and that therefore theoretically he might lose that position). In July 2008, he established a new organization, named Jama'ah Ansar al-Tauhid (JAT). While he was engaged in broadening his new organization in many regions in Indonesia, Ba'asyir was detained again by the authorities in August 2010 on the charge of having established a guerrilla training camp in Aceh, and at the time of writing he remains incarcerated.

The stigma of terrorism put Pondok Ngruki in a difficult position. Although only some Ngruki graduates have been involved in violent actions in the name of Islam in Indonesia, the belief that it is a nest of terrorism has not been expunged. In other words, even though violent Islamic radicalism is not mainstream at Pondok Ngruki, the fact that the school has been the centre of a clandestine Islamic movement is undisputable. Indeed, there are many Ngruki graduates who know nothing about the clandestine Islamic organization and cannot give clear answers as to why their counterparts were involved in such violent actions. Whatever the reason, the fact of its graduates' radical involvement cannot be denied. At the very least, Pondok Ngruki planted the seeds of radical ideology in its pupils, which eventually grew and developed.

In Ngruki itself, not much remains of the radical spirit that characterized it in the days of Abdullah Sungkar's leadership. Ba'asyir remains respected as one of the founding fathers and the successor to Sungkar, but his influence in the *pesantren* is limited. Pondok Ngruki appears to be at a crossroads, as there are many interests and different groups within the *pesantren*. Ba'asyir's new organization, the JAT, and its ideology have not found much support in Ngruki. While some of the senior teachers want to push Ngruki more towards Salafism, the foundation to which Pondok Ngruki is attached wants it to be a moderate educational institution. It is likely that radical groups (underground organizations) will be increasingly marginal in Pondok Ngruki, although they may retain stronger support in some of the other *pesantren* of the Ngruki network.

As mentioned before, many of the most radical *ustadz* and *santri* left Ngruki in 1995, and joined or established *pesantren* that were more open

to radical ideas. Thus the centre of radicalism shifted to such pesantren as Dar al-Syahadah in Boyolali, Al-Islam in Lamongan, Muttaqien in Rembang, and the Ma'had Ali Al-Nur in Sukoharjo.³⁵ These are mostly small educational institutions, but they remain significant, if only because they have gravitated towards, and receive support from, Salafi groups in the Middle East. In the following paragraphs, I examine two of these schools, both located in the larger Surakarta region: the pesantren Dar al-Syahadah in Boyolali and the Ma'had Ali Al-Nur.

Dar al-Syahadah was founded in 1994 and is currently led by Mustaqim, who graduated from Ngruki in 1989 and who continued his study at the Ma'had 'Ali of Pondok Ngruki while at the same time serving as a teacher in the pesantren. Not only does Dar al-Syahadah imitate Pondok Ngruki's educational system, but Mustaqim also considers Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to be his spiritual leader, especially in managing the pesantren. Located in the western part of Surakarta, this pesantren has about 40 *ustadz* and some 850 *santri*. Mustaqim acknowledges that for building his school he received financial assistance from various institutions in the Middle East as well as from Indonesia, thanks to his connections in the Salafi/Wahhabi network. He also claims to have good relations with the local authorities in Boyolali. Local police officers, however, have admitted that they know little about this pesantren, although they meet Mustaqim quite often. Furthermore, they add that the pesantren is often closed.³⁶ Judging by Mustaqim's network and his attachment to Ba'asyir's ideology, I believe that this pesantren is currently more conservative and more strictly Salafi than Pondok Ngruki. The involvement of some of its graduates — Gempur Budi Angkoro (a.k.a. Jabir), Lufti Haidaroh (a.k.a. Ubeid), and Salik Firdaus — in violent activities in Indonesia reveals its connections with the clandestine Islamic movement, the JI.³⁷

Ma'had Ali Al-Nur was established by loyal followers of Abdullah Sungkar, who had left Ngruki following the internal conflict in 1995 and Sungkar's split from the NII in 1993. The founders, Abdurrahim and Abdul Manaf, supported by devout followers, initially established the new school at Gading village, near Ngruki. This institution proved to be quite successful, which encouraged the managing foundation, Al-Nur, to acquire a better location in Waru, in the district of Sukoharjo. Unlike Pondok Ngruki and Dar al-Syahadah, this institution only offers college-level (*Ma'had Ali*) education. Therefore, all the students of this institution are graduates of other pesantren in the Ngruki network. Some former students of the Ma'had Ali Al-Nur have also been involved in violent activities in Indonesia.³⁸ However, the school itself appears to be drifting towards a

Saudi-style variety of Salafism, which is politically quietist. Bahrudin, who led the Ma'had Ali Al-Nur until recently, is a Ngruki graduate who continued his studies at the Saudi-sponsored Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (the Institute Islamic and Arabic Studies, or LIPIA) in Jakarta. Unlike Pondok Ngruki, which has no formal relations with any specific Middle Eastern movement or institution, Bahrudin claims that the *Ma'had Ali* has affiliated itself with a Salafi university in Saudi Arabia. Bahrudin's ambition was to produce, in cooperation with this institution, well-trained graduates who are steeped in knowledge of the original sources of Islam and capable of challenging those Indonesian Muslim scholars who have been influenced by Western values.

NII, JI AND SALAFISM

Since Abdullah Sungkar broke with Ajengan Masduki's NII and established his own organization JI, the Ngruki network, or at least the underground activism within it, has been split along ideological lines. The massive exodus of *ustadz* and *santri* from the pesantren in 1995 was due to a conflict between the cautious governing board and Sungkar loyalists, who followed the latter's trajectory of religious and political radicalization. At the time of foundation, the new pesantrens Dar al-Syahadah and Ma'had 'Ali an-Nur were therefore dominated by JI supporters. Masduki's NII had, however, been well entrenched in the entire Ngruki network and it maintained a presence in some parts of the network even after the formation of JI. After Sungkar's death, the NII (currently led by Dadang Hafidz) appears to have regained strength. This strengthening appears not to have been due to defections from JI; there was also an ideological shift in JI after Sungkar's death, but this took it closer towards Saudi-style Salafism. NII and JI are distinct and to some extent competitors, but from outside it is often difficult or impossible to distinguish between these two streams in the Ngruki network.

There are thus, in the Solo region, a number of different groups that we have described as Salafi, but there are obvious differences between them. In the academic literature (e.g., Wiktorowicz 2006; Meijer 2009), it is usual to distinguish between "purist" or "quietist" Salafism, political or *haraki* ("activist") Salafism and *jihadi* Salafism. All share the principle of taking the Prophet and his first followers as the models to be emulated and rejecting rationalist and modernist interpretations. "Purists" focus exclusively on personal piety and reject all forms of political activism, including the democratic process. *Haraki* Salafism emerged from the encounter of the

political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and purist Salafi doctrine. *Harakis* establish formal organizations and engage in various forms of political activism, although they too reject democracy as an un-Islamic institution. *Jihadi* Salafism finally proclaims *jihad*, conceived as actual warfare, to be a central religious duty.

Jihadi Salafism is an elusive category, and its relation to the other styles of Salafism is not obvious. The Laskar Jihad, with its headquarters in Yogyakarta, that took part in the regional conflicts in the Moluccas and elsewhere in the early 2000s, emerged from a “purist” Salafi network, and it was disbanded on the instruction of a Salafi sheikh in Saudi Arabia (Hasan 2006). Other jihad warriors involved in regional conflicts were affiliated with the Jama’ah Islamiyah network, and others yet were not Salafi at all. There are a number of institutions in the Solo region that are evidently “purist” Salafi, such as the Dar al-Salaf foundation, the Ittiba’ al-Sunnah foundation, and the pesantrens Imam Bukhori, Al-Ukhuwwah, and Ibnu Taymiyah. As befits “purists”, they have not been involved in any form of political or societal activism. The most significant Salafi groups in the region, however, are the activist or *haraki* ones; I am inclined to place both the Ngruki network and the Jama’ah Gumuk in this category.

More important than the classification of types of Salafism is perhaps the increasing orientation towards religious authorities based in the Middle East. Among the purist Salafis, some are recognized as more learned than others, but in all important matters they consult sheikhs in Saudi Arabia or Yemen. In the Ngruki network, Abdullah Sungkar used to be the highest authority in religious as well as political matters, but even during his lifetime, followers who took jihad training in Pakistan came under the influence of Saudi sheikhs they met there. After Sungkar’s death, some followed Ba’asyir as the supreme leader, but there has been a general shift of authority towards Saudi Arabia. Some individuals who fought in Afghanistan have retained relations with Saudi veterans of the Afghan jihad. Others have established new relations with Saudi persons and institutions that provide both funding and religious guidance. Both the pondok Dar al-Syhadah and the Ma’had Ali An-Nur have established their own connections with Saudi Islamic foundations for funding — the latter through the good services of Ba’asyir’s eldest son, Abdul Rasyid, who graduated from a Saudi university.

The Jama’ah Gumuk also tends to Salafism (as shown by the literature that is being used), but does not appear to have direct connections with the Middle East. Because of its vigilante activism and its rejection of Indonesia’s

political system on religious grounds, I consider it a *haraki* Salafi movement, like the Ngruki network. Both aim for a change of the political order, but believe this should be accomplished by first educating and shaping individuals and society. They may allow for the possibility of violent action in the future, when conditions are ripe, and individual members of both networks may be drawn to jihadist action, as we have seen. The leaders of both networks, however, are quite emphatic in proclaiming that in the present situation, they consider violence inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

Solo is rife with radical Islamic groups, as has been highlighted in this chapter. It is not just a matter of the pesantren of Ngruki and its network, the only group that has received ample international attention. As I have shown, there is a much wider range of radical movements in this city and the surrounding districts. This is perhaps surprising, because Solo also has the reputation of being the centre of Java's syncretistic court tradition as well as lower class *abangan* culture. Orthodox Muslims remain a minority among the Solonese. But it is probably precisely this minority position that has given Islam in Solo its radical edge.

Another factor of significance is the weakness of the mainstream organizations that channel Muslim activism elsewhere. Although Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are not entirely absent, they are definitely not the dominant organizations that they are elsewhere and therefore cannot have the same moderating influence. Solo lacks a traditional leadership that could take care of social cohesion. Unlike Yogyakarta, the royal houses of Solo (Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran) do not play a significant role in society and do not command much respect among the population. Religious authority is highly fragmented; social relations are loose and polarized. The city is dominated by organizations of local provenance, but these have not played an integrating role but rather contributed to further polarization.

Muslim organizations in Solo have not expressed demands for *shari`a*-based regional regulations, which were foremost on the agenda of Muslim groups in many other regions (notably in West Java and South Sulawesi). This is probably because they were aware of their minority position here. Islamic radicalism has been expressed in two distinct ways: the struggle for an Islamic state, as in the NII and JI networks, and vigilantism. The perception that orthodox Muslims remain a minority and that Solonese society is still, to a large extent, *abangan*, has persuaded activists that the

first objective in the Islamic struggle should be not to fight the *abangan* but to bring them over to a stricter version of Islam. Both the Majelis Tafsir Alqur'an and the Jama'ah Gumuk have specifically been targeting *abangan* and have been reasonably successful in recruiting them. The process of conversion of *abangan* to *santri* religious belief and practice has been taking place all over Java, and the Muhammadiyah and the NU have been major actors in this process. In Solo, with its large *abangan* majority and deeply rooted *abangan* traditions, the modalities of this process will be of crucial importance to the public expressions of Islam.

Notes

- ¹ Solo and Surakarta are alternative names for the same city. The official name of the city is Kotamadya Surakarta (the municipality of Surakarta). The word Solo, however, is commonly used nowadays.
- ² *Batik* refers to a generic wax-resistant dyeing technique used on textiles.
- ³ On traditional language in Solo, see Siegel (1986).
- ⁴ International Crisis Group (2002). Although the accusations of connections with Al Qaeda were never proven, many still believe that Ba'asyir was involved in this clandestine organization and hold him responsible for a string of violent incidents including the bombing of churches at Christmas 2000 and the 2002 Bali bombing.
- ⁵ Famous books written by the above poets include *Serat Ambiya*, *Serat Centhini*, *Serat Cabolek*, *Serat Kalatidha*, *Serat Sabdajati*, *Serat Sabdatama*, and *Pustaka Radja*. For further accounts see Sukri (2004), Florida (1996).
- ⁶ Both R. Hadipati Sosrodiningrat and Penghulu Tafsir Anom served as royal employees (*abdi dalem*) of the Kasunanan Kingdom. Since the school was a royal school, the kingdom covered all of the *madrasah's* expenses. In traditional Java, *penghulu* is a religious authority in districts or sub-districts.
- ⁷ At its peak in 1925, the students of the *madrasah* numbered as many as 700. Moh. Ardani (1983) asserts that Madrasah Mamba' al-'Ulum was the oldest Islamic modern school in Indonesia after that which had been founded by *Jami'at al-Khair* in Jakarta. However, since the influence of this *madrasah* did not reach as far as West Java and Batavia, the Indonesian government does not regard this *madrasah* as having played a significant role in the development of Islamic education in Indonesia. For further remarks on this issue, see Ardani (1983).
- ⁸ For a further account of Ba'asyir's life, see *Sabili* IX, no. 16, 8 February 2002, p. 38; *Republika*, 20 October 2002, available at <www.republika.co.id> (accessed 18 December 2006); Sudarjat (2006).
- ⁹ P-4 stands for Pedomam Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, "Guide for the Understanding and Practising of Pancasila".

- ¹⁰ For more on these events, see Suryahardi (1982), pp. 300–5; Ba’asyir (2006).
- ¹¹ On this, see “Akhir Perburuan di Soreang”, *Tempo*, 1 August 1981, Jakarta, pp. 12–13.
- ¹² In fact there is no clear and definitive information about who initially used *usrah* as a *tarbiyah* method. However, Imaduddin was among the first to employ and adopt *usrah* for university students in Bandung. Imaduddin was a lecturer at the ITB and was well known as a leading figure of Islamic activism in Indonesia. For more information on *usrah*, see Syukur (2003).
- ¹³ The tabloid was initially published in 1981. After being banned by the government in 1984, the tabloid resurfaced under the name of *Al-Ikhwān*, until it was banned for good in 1985. Some Gajah Mada University lecturers were involved as the tabloid’s board members: Dr Amien Rais, Dr Kuntowijoyo, and Dr Sahirul Alim.
- ¹⁴ Pondok Ngruki is a large boarding school, within which there are a number of distinct educational streams, some offering a partly general curriculum (called *madrasah* in Indonesia), others exclusively religious (the said two *kulliyah*).
- ¹⁵ The Kauman is the district adjoining the central mosque, where religious functionaries live. The historical centre of Muhammadiyah is in the Kauman of Yogyakarta.
- ¹⁶ *Bid’ah* (“innovation”) includes all religious beliefs and practices that did not exist in the time of the Prophet and the first Muslim community and that are presumably borrowings from other cultural traditions; *khurafat* are superstitions and fairy tales; *takhayyul* are (beliefs based on) fantasies and hallucinations. These three are commonly announced as the chief targets in campaigns for the purification of Islam.
- ¹⁷ Interview with Ahmad Sukino, the most senior leader of the MTA, in Solo on 7 February 2007.
- ¹⁸ See further the MTA homepage, available at <<http://mta-online.com>>.
- ¹⁹ The most controversial issue surrounding the 2003 education law concerns a school’s obligation to provide all students with religious education in their own religion, which would oblige Christian schools to offer Islamic education. (Many Muslim parents send their children to Christian schools because of their reputation for better quality education; very few Christian parents send their children to Muslim schools.)
- ²⁰ The *Rencana Undang-undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi* (RUU APP) has not been issued yet, as it lacks widespread public support, especially among the local government in Bali, although it has been enthusiastically supported by many Islamic organizations, such as the MTA.
- ²¹ Salafis consider *isbal*, the wearing of garments that hang below the ankles, as prohibited (haram),
- ²² *Mega-Bintang* literally means “big star”. *Mega* was a short name for Megawati Sukarnoputri, who represented the PDI-P, while the *Bintang* or star was part of the symbol of the Islamic party, the PPP.

- 23 *Hisbah* is the principle of commanding right and forbidding wrong, i.e., controlling public morality. The Tim Hisbah is a relatively new organization (established in 2008), that gained some notoriety when its leader, Sigit Hermawan Wijayanto alias Sigit Qordhowi, was shot dead by an anti-terror police unit on 14 May 2011. Sigit was suspected of being responsible for several terrorist bombings. See International Crisis Group (2012), p. 2.
- 24 Sunan Bonang is one of the nine saints who reputedly brought Islam to Java; his grave on the north coast is a place of pilgrimage.
- 25 The FPIS is not to be confused with the Jakarta-based *Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front, FPI) led by Habieb Rizieq. The FPIS has nothing to do with the FPI, although the FPI also has its branch in Solo. Journalists have frequently wrongly described the FPIS as the *Front Pembela Islam Surakarta*.
- 26 Interview with Chalid Hasan in Solo on 9 November 2006.
- 27 Conversations with Mudzakir, Solo, 17 November 2006 and Yogyakarta, 21 February 2007. See also *Suara Front*, no. 01/II/29 June 2001, p. 3.
- 28 Interview with Chalid Hasan in Solo on 9 November 2006.
- 29 Their conviction is based on verse 42 of the Quranic sura Al-Baqarah saying “*wa la talbisu al-haqq bi al-batil wa taktumu al-haqq wa antum ta’lamun*” (and cover not Truth with falsehood, nor conceal the Truth when ye know). Interview with Mudzakir, Solo, 17 November 2006.
- 30 *Suara Front*, no. 31, I, 15–21 December 2000.
- 31 The notion of *shura* (consultation) differs from that of (liberal) democracy. However, many people see in *shura* an Islamic variety of democracy. Unlike liberal democracy, in which supreme authority lies in the hands of people or their representatives, *shura* is a concept in which supreme authority lies in the hands of God, disseminated through humans as rational beings. In other words, the notion of *shura* is a kind of guided democracy in which the authority of the people does not conflict with the sovereignty of Allah.
- 32 Mudzakir’s conviction regarding the necessity of the unity of *ummah* is based on Muhammad’s famous saying that “Muslims would split into 72 or 73 factions and all of them would go to the hell except one, i.e., ‘*ahlu al-sunnah wa al-jama’ah*’”.
- 33 Other schools in the Ngruki network include: Pondok Abidin and Mujahidin in Solo, Pondok Syuhodo and Ulil Albab in Sukoharjo, Pondok Ibnu al-Qayyim in Yogyakarta, and Pondok Tarbiyah al-Mukmin in Magelang. And there are other such *pesantren* outside Java in Sumatera and Nusa Tenggara Timur. These *pesantren* may be radical in terms of their ideology, but not in action.
- 34 When Ba’asyir established the MMI in Yogyakarta, for instance, Wahyuddin took part, and he even acted as one of the board members of MMI in Surakarta. However, when Ba’asyir broke with the MMI and established a new organization, the Jama’ah Ansar al- Tauhid, or JAT, Wahyuddin did not

follow him.

- ³⁵ *Ma'had 'Ali* is a generic term for a tertiary religious school open to graduates of Islamic high schools or *Madrasah Aliyah*.
- ³⁶ The *Jakarta Post*, 16 October 2003, available at <www.thejakartapost.com> (accessed 17 January 2007).
- ³⁷ Jabir, who was recruited (but not deployed) as a suicide bomber for the 2004 Kuningan bombing, is the cousin of well-known JI activist Fathurrahman Al-Ghozi. He was finally shot dead in his hiding place in Wonosobo in April 2006. Ubeid was involved in the preparation for the Kuningan bombing in 2004, while Salik was one of the suicide backpack bombers in the Bali II bombing in 2005.
- ³⁸ These include Sardona Siliwangi, Suramto (a.k.a. Deni), Bagus Budi Prawoto (a.k.a. Urwah), Lutfi Haedaroh (a.k.a. Ubeid), and Heri (a.k.a. Umar). It is significant here that some of the above men also graduated from or attended either Pondok Ngruki or *Dar al-Syahadah*.

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